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Several concerns with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), including
acknowledgement that the process contains human subjectivity, can be found in
literature; however very little research has been conducted to identify where and to what
extent this variation is found. This thesis investigated sources of variation related to
human decision making within FMEA. Participants were required to determine the
effects of given failure modes by selection of a severity level given varied input
information. The study found that participants were not able to sift through the provided
information and identify the appropriate cues relating data relevance to the failure mode
under analysis. Thus, it appeared that more information will reduce conservatism –
however the quality of the information and experience level does not have an effect. The
study concluded that FMEAs contain significant subjectivity and data quality assessment
must form part of the FMEA framework.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1

State of Reliability
In order to attain high quality and reliability in large organizations and complex

systems, it is important to ensure customer needs are translated through identifiable
activities into a useful and effective product. This collection of activities goes by several
names, such as Systems Engineering or more commonly the Quality Function in a
Quality Engineering environment [1]. These activities are crucial to ensure reliable, costeffective and sustainable products both in the commercial and government sector.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized alarming trends in the
acquisition of new products or systems. First, the percentage of new acquisitions failing
to meet reliability requirements is increasing. Second, the percentage of fielded systems
that have decreasing durability and reliability performance is also increasing [2]. These
trends were clearly expressed in a memorandum to the DoD community from the
Director of Systems Engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2010. The
memo stated that over a 25 year period a staggering 25% of defense systems were not
found suitable in operational testing. The memo further stated that “there is no question
the systems emerging from our design and development efforts are often not reliable” [3].
Resultant poor performance has been illustrated with several examples, including the
Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) unmanned aerial system which only
1

achieved 1/10th of its mean time between system aborts requirement [3], and more
recently the F-35 aircraft [4]. As a result, the DoD has instituted several initiatives aimed
at reversing the trend. These initiatives include:


Strengthening of oversight and accountability through the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2008



Reduction of risk through revitalized Systems and Reliability Engineering
processes



Standardization of reliability best practices in new programs though a
reliability scorecard



Shift to Physics of Failure (PoF) based reliability prediction [2].

Additionally, a report from the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on
Developmental Test and Evaluation concluded that:
“The single most important step necessary to correct high suitability failure rates
is to ensure programs are formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy
from the beginning, including a robust RAM program, as an integral part of design and
development. No amount of testing will compensate for deficiencies in RAM program
foundation” [2].

2

1.2

Achieving Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM)
As stated in the DSB Task Force report [2], development of a robust RAM

program must be accomplished early in design in order to reduce life cycle cost while
achieving performance objectives.
In order for a product or system to achieve RAM goals the following activities
must be performed (adapted from [5]) as part of a RAM program:


Identification of reliability, availability and maintainability goals or
requirements



Iteratively forecast, measure and verify that these requirements are met



Ensuring quality problems are not induced by manufacturing and
assembly procedures

One major aspect of a RAM program is measuring progress towards
requirements, which is intrinsically coupled with risk assessment. Risk assessment must
identify both technical and programmatic risks to successfully meeting or exceeding
these requirements. These must then be further decomposed into high, medium and low
risks – and addressed early in design. Identification of these technical risks is not a trivial
task, and requires both pro-active thinking and rigorous analysis tools or processes.
Risk assessment must also be applied throughout the product life-cycle. For any
project, five phases can be identified in a generic fashion [5]:


Product concept phase



Design phase



Produce development phase



Manufacturing and Support phase
3

Application of risk assessment during the product concept phase, when little or no
data is available, is problematic. At this stage in the design, testing has not been
performed nor does a physical design exist; however, this is a crucial time to incorporate
RAM. In this phase, FMEA is frequently utilized, particularly since data is not available
in order to develop failure modes based on the proposed design. The resulting analysis
can then be utilized to evaluate weak areas of the design and/or compare other design
alternatives. The variables within FMEA are largely quantified by individuals and/or
teams.
Risk management consists of several elements, to include assessment,
management and risk communication [5]. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, risk assessment
consists of assessment, management and communication of risks. FMEA cradles all parts
of this risk management framework. For example, failure modes are identified, along
with probability and severity classifications, all of which forms part of risk assessment.
However, mitigation strategies for failure modes form part of risk management, while the
process itself facilitates risk communication.

4

FMEA can be a very useful tool in risk management – but may also be heavily
plagued by human subjectivity. Thus, due to the proactive nature of FMEA it can be
utilized to establish a risk management policy [6].

Risk Assessment
•What can go wrong?
•How likly is it?
•What are the consequences?

Risk Management

Risk
Communication

•Which risks are
significant?
•What are mitigation
strategies?
•How effective are
mitigation plans?

•Nature of Risk
•Nature of Benefits
•Uncertainty
•Options Considered

Figure 1.1

1.2.1

Risk Assessment Framework

Risk Assessment Tools in RAM
There are several prevailing tools available which can be used to proactively

assess risk in terms of RAM [1]. These include (but are not limited to) [5]:


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)



Design Guidelines and Best Practices
o Design for Reliability (DfR)
o Design for Manufacturing (DfM)
5

o Design for Tests (DfT)


Modeling and Simulation



Highly Accelerated Life Tests (HALT) and Accelerated Life Tests (ALT)

FMEA is one of the most widely utilized tools due to:


Well defined process



Ability to be tailored to systems or process analyses



Ability to capture expert opinion



Ability to be performed with little or no data



Provision of the capability to analyze and compare different systems or concepts
FMEA has shown success across many industries [6-10]. One benefit of FMEA

as an analysis tool is that it is structured and usually includes a diverse group of people
from different background and experiences, with the ultimate goal of identifying potential
threats to a complex system. This potentially allows different viewpoints to be
incorporated leading to a more robust analysis. The analysis is accomplished by
analyzing failure modes, or technical risks that are reasonable likely to occur, along with
their associated consequences (or severity). Further, in methodologies such as RCM it is
further extended to develop mitigation strategies [11].
FMEA also has problems. These problems have received extensive attention in
literature, with several changes proposed in order to address possible identified shortfalls
within the methodology. Humans make subjective decisions [12], and their inter-rater
reliability is not known in FMEA. Thus, the reliability or the “extent to which … any
measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” [13] is largely unknown
for FMEA. This subjectivity is driven by internal biases and has been shown to occur
6

during probability estimation (for example in fault trees) [12]. Additionally, the
subjectivity occurs in most (if not all people) to include experts and novice users [12].
The extent and effects of this subjectivity is largely unknown. FMEA requires several
variables to be quantified by either individuals, teams or experts and can be seen as a
complex task. The task complexity is rooted in many related variables (FM 1 influencing
the probability of FM 2 for example), undefined variables (data not available) and that
several possible solutions exist (for example mitigation strategies) [14]. This bias has
been recognized and a plethora of techniques adapted from evidence theory, grey theory
and fuzzy logic [7-8, 15-17] have emerged. Recent research has also indicated that our
biases and behavior is closely tied to our genetic make-up and the underlying cognitive
processes [18]. Decision making in a clinical setting was explored by Smith et al [19].
In their research they highlighted that understanding of the problem at hand and
contextual factors are both important in determining outcomes. Thus, they recommend
that both the individual’s attributes as well as context must be taken into account.
However, as noted by Bozdag et al. very little research has been focused on
understanding uncertainty and variations ratings amongst experts [11]. Bozdag et al.
further develop a failure mode assessment and prioritization model based on fuzzy logic
that both incorporates individual and consensus judgment into a risk rating [11]. As
innovative as this model is, there is almost no literature available that illustrates where in
FMEA human variability is most prevalent. The healthcare community has performed a
few small studies in order to probe this question, which are detailed in Chapter 2 [20,21].
Understanding where variation is most prevalent will aid in developing models that can
be validated and ultimately improve the FMEA process.
7

1.3

Selection of FMEA
As described in section 1.2 several tools are available during the risk analysis and

reliability engineering process. These tools were evaluated for inclusion in this study,
however FMEA was ultimately selected as the most appropriate tool. Table 1.1, provides
a comparison of various tools available based on the opinion of the researchers. FMEA
was ultimately utilized within this study due to its widespread application and ease of
use.
Table 1.1
Tool
FMEA
Reliability
Block
Modeling
Fault Tree
Analysis
Probabilistic
Risk
Assessment

1.4

Comparison of FMEA to other Common Engineering Tools

High

Crossindustry
application
High

Mathematical
Skill
Requirements
Low

Low

Low

High
Low

Interpretation
Easy

Prevalence
in industry

Input
Requirements

High

Low

High

Low

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

Low

High

Summary of Main Contributions
This thesis will delve into human subjectivity during FMEA, both of experienced

and non-experienced users. The main goal is to fill the literature gap with empirical
evidence indicating the role of FMEA experience levels of analysts and the role of
available –information on variable selection. The thesis will focus on variables associated
with risk quantification. This will provide empirical data that can be used to refine
proposed models within the literature.
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CHAPTER II
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
2.1

Background
The efforts to strengthen RAM activities early in design emphasize various

Design for Reliability (DfR) tools such as FMEA. DfR embraces the customer needs and
is a process though which customer satisfaction is maximized. The process utilizes
numerous integrated tools in order to support a product (and/or design) from cradle to
grave, while ensuring the highest reliability at the lowest life cycle cost. Failure Mode
Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used extensively throughout industry in order to improve
system reliability and aid in risk assessment, and is a well-recognized DfR tool. It was
utilized as early as the 1960s by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) on programs such as the Apollo, Viking, Voyager and Skylab explorations. The
process was also adopted early on by the Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) in
1967. The use of FMEA spread rapidly to other industries during the 1970s and
subsequent years, and is now utilized in a variety of industries including military,
semiconductors, and the food service industry. More recently FMEA has been adopted
within the healthcare industry in order in order to assess the high-risk process of care
[22]. FMEA is useful in understanding the failure modes of systems or products,
qualifying the effects of failure, and aiding in the development of mitigation strategies. It
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is a useful tool in improving quality, reliability, and the maintainability of designs, and is
a critical analysis component in risk management.
2.2

Process and Analysis Procedure
FMEA is a methodology to determine potential failure modes of an end item. The

end item can be a system, process, software or components. The FMEA process starts
with the identification of the various functions of the end item, which are closely tied to
the mission and operating context. These functions naturally flow out of the inherent
design of the process or concept. Once the functions and functional failures have been
identified, the analysis develops failure modes. Figure 2.1 illustrates a typical FMEA
process [11,23].

Figure 2.1

Steps of the FMEA Process [11]
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Failure modes are the result of a failure mechanism and are a specific manner by
which function is lost [24]. Each failure mode has many variables to include local, next
higher and end effects if the failure mode occurs. The effects are utilized to determine
the severity of the failure mode. Several scales are proposed; however they all rank the
consequences of the failure mode from negligible to severe. The consequences are
usually defined in terms of cost and safety in compliance with customer safety programs.
For example, if a failure mode results in high cost and/or large safety impact it may be
ranked with a high severity. Additionally, each failure mode is given a probability of
failure (which can be based on the Mean Time Between Failure), detection method,
classified as safety or non-safety.
Once a failure mode has been developed, it is scored, or ranked relative to all
other failure modes. There are several approaches, such as criticality assessment and
Risk Priority Numbering (RPN). The RPN method multiplies the probability of
occurrence, detection probability and severity in order to determine a relative ranking.
An alternate method (and preferred by the researcher) is criticality assessment. This
method utilizes a Hazard Risk Index (HRI) that is color coded red, green, and yellow
corresponding to the associated risk level as determined by the customer. Each failure
mode is then plotted on this HRI according to their associated probability of occurrence
and assigned severity.
There are two key outputs from an FMEA. The first is the associated risk
ranking, which aids in identification of high priority failure modes. The second is the
associated mitigation strategy. Methodologies such as Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM) have utilized FMEAs along with criticality assessment in order to develop cost11

effective maintenance programs. RCM compares the associated risk and cost of failure
(or doing nothing) with the cost of preventive maintenance or redesign (failure mode
mitigation). This comparison is then utilized in order to determine cost effective
mitigation strategies. In cases where safety is a concern, failure modes should always
include some form of mitigation.
2.2.1

Biases and Team Dynamics Affect Quality
FMEAs are developed utilizing different data sets, as well as anecdotal

information and expert knowledge; however, even in cases where a large amount of data
is available, the process contains significant amounts of subjectivity. For example, one
analyst could air on the side of caution and rank failure modes with a severe
consequence, while another might not. This often results the determination of different
risk levels and mitigation strategies based on the analysts’ own cognitive biases,
background knowledge and technical expertise. These differences can potentially lead to
a large amount of variation in the process and thus reduce overall quality.
One method to improve quality is utilizing a thorough review process, as well as a
team-based approach. Conceptually, addition of team members with varied expertise
would improve the overall quality of the product due to the addition of varied levels of
expertise and viewpoints. The formation of teams, however, can present a new set of
problems. These problems could include communication challenges, group think,
ineffective leadership and lack of participation. The analysis is, therefore, not only
impacted by individual subjectivity and bias but also team dynamics. The error is in part
dependent on the experience of team members in failure analysis and system familiarity,
as well as known cognitive biases. The situation is frequently compounded when known
12

data regarding failure mode occurrence and/or effects is limited. In these situations
additional subjectivity is introduced since subject matter expertise and prediction
techniques must be utilized. One proposed method to reduce individual bias is to
incorporate the right mix of team members, including the customer, engineers, operators,
maintainers, and management; however, while these measures are recommended, they do
not necessarily reduce human error [25, 26]. Team formation also poses additional
concerns, such as team size and inter-personal dynamics. Integration of FMEA within a
large quality control system; which includes in-process audits can reduce this risk
(assuming that the larger corporate culture does not introduce its own set of bias). One
method to improve quality is utilizing a thorough review process, as well as a team-based
approach.
2.2.2

Lack of FMEA Validation Research
While some of the available literature does evaluate the FMEA process and

explore possible sources of error, research-based validation of FMEA value and
effectiveness is severely lacking, as are conclusive recommendations for improvement of
the process, in terms of the human factor. Some work has been done within the healthcare
community, which previously relied largely upon retroactive risk management, with the
goal of quantifying the reliability and validity of FMEA as a technique of risk analysis.
Specifically, results from recent studies demonstrated little reliability and validity within
the healthcare setting of FMEA. The researchers did not disregard the potential value or
conclude that the FMEA process offered no benefit whatsoever, but did clearly reveal
flaws which necessitate process refinement [21, 26-29]. These studies highlighted the
discrepancies between the severity ratings selected by different groups as well as the lack
13

of correlation of risks identified. Shebl et al. found that the two different participant
groups not only identified different risks, but also rated overlapping risks differently [21].
Differences were also found between conditions which used consensuses to determine an
overall severity rating and those that simply averaged individual ratings by Ashley and
Armitage [30].
Potts et al. investigated the validity of structured risk analysis methods. They were
specifically interested comparing the resultant outcomes of two conditions: analysis using
different techniques, and the replicated analysis by different groups using the same
technique. They investigated the Structured What If Technique (SWIFT) and HFMEA
(FMEA tailored to the healthcare industry) in a workshop setting [31]. Teams of five
participants per group worked together to make decisions using each of the two
techniques. Additionally, all the participants were new to risk and task analysis with no
experience in either technique. The participants were also provided with a hierarchical
task analysis diagram previously developed. First, the risks identified in each technique
were compared for overlap (both in terms of the actual risk and the associated severity
rating) as well as overlap with current risk management processes.

The participants

identified 61 total risks, with three deemed critical when utilizing the SWIFT approach.
The HFMEA resulted in a total of 72 risks, with 12 deemed high risk. The researchers
compared the identified risks and concluded that 33 (54.1 %) risks identified by SWIFT
were not identified by HFMEA. In turn, HFMEA had 42 (58.3 %) risks that were not
identified by SWIFT. Additionally, the researchers concluded that there was little
overlap of high risks items between the two analysis techniques [31].

14

2.2.3

The Risk Priority Number (RPN)
The Risk Priority Number (RPN) that is utilized within FMEA is a method aimed

at ranking and prioritizing failure modes – in order to develop mitigation strategies and
reduce the overall consequences of the failure mode occurring. The higher the RPN, the
higher the possible risk. The goal of the analysis is threefold. First, it provides a way to
measure which failure modes pose significant risk and should be removed or mitigated
from the system. Second, it provides insight into which failure modes can be corrected or
mitigated. Finally, it provides a basis to determine which failure modes can be ignored
(and allowed to occur) with no adverse safety or cost implications [32].
Depending on the approach followed, there are slight deviations in how the RPN
is calculated. If the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology is followed,
criticality is calculated by only including the severity rating and probability of
occurrence. Detectability calculations, though not utilized in the RCM methodology, are
included in other methods. Bowles [32] points out in his mathematical analysis of the
RPN that there are significant flaws within that approach. In the case where the RPN is
calculated by multiplying Severity (S) with probability of occurrence (O) and
detectability (D), and assuming a range of 1 to 10 for each factor a resulting RPN range
from 1 to 1000 is obtained. As explained by Bowles, three factors within the RPN are
ordinal scales where items are ranked in series; however, the interval size between
measurements are not specified [32]. Siegel (1956) further states that the intervals are
determined subjectively and not identical to each other [33]. Thus, conducting
multiplication utilizing these factors violates basic mathematical principles [32, 33].

15

Bowles further highlights four additional concerns with utilizing the RPN in its current
form. These include:


Holes in the scale. The RPN scale is not continuous and various numbers
between 1 and 1000 cannot be formed by the product of S, O and D. This
is specifically evident in higher numbers (600+). Only 120 unique
numbers can be formed with 88 % of the range empty.



Duplication of RPNs. RPNs can be formed with many combinations of S,
O and D thus making the inaccurate assumption that each factor is equally
important.



Sensitivity to small changes. The RPN can be affected significantly by a
small change in one factor, especially if the other factors are large
numbers.



Utilizing a single dimension RP to quantify and rank a design encourages
management to set arbitrary thresholds- which may not be realistic.

2.2.4

Other FMEA Concerns
The healthcare industry has also questioned both the reliability and validity of

FMEA. Reliability has been explored in several studies, with little research performed on
FMEA validity [21, 30, 34]. Validity is important since, without it analysis techniques
such as FMEA are prone to skepticism regarding their value, and it is difficult to provide
feedback in order to improve the tool. Furthermore, as stated by Kirwan (1996)
techniques that depend on significant amounts of judgement may not adequately and

16

accurately quantify risk [35]. In spite of the concerns with the FMEA methodology, the
approach has been shown to improve quality and safety in the healthcare field [36].
Validity is defined as a measure to assess whether an instrument measures what it
was designed to measure [37, 38]. Thus, in the context of FMEA, validity aims to
measure whether or not risks are proactively and thoroughly identified, parameter
estimates line up with observed data and identify if the tool is indeed appropriate. Shebl
et al. (2012) investigated FMEA validity utilizing several measures [20]. These included
face validity, which refers to how relevant experts view the tool. Context validity was
defined as a measure of how well the FMEA results mirror information available in the
application domain. Criterion validity refers to the level of correlation of the FMEA
outputs to other measurement systems of the same variables. And finally, construct
validity was used to “determine the extent to which a particular measure relates to other
measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts that
are being measured” [20].
Their study, conducted during 2012, utilized two groups from a hospital setting
that were tasked to complete a FMEA on prescribing, administering and monitoring of
two prescription drugs [20]. Both groups were familiar with the process, and provided
the same input information. The researchers observed how these drugs were
administered in a clinical setting, and mapped the subsequent process to a flow chart.
This was then compared to the mapped processes as determined by the FMEA teams in
order to address face validity. Although there were differences between the FMEA
flowcharts and the observation flow chart, the major steps within the process correlated
well. Thus, the team concluded that face validity appeared adequate for FMEA.
17

Criterion validity was deemed low by Shebl et al. due to several reasons. First, 59 % of
failures observed in clinical data were identified by the FMEA team. Additionally, the
probability of failure and the actual observed frequency in the clinical data showed little
correlation. In general, the FMEA team appeared to estimate the probabilities higher
than actual observed data indicated. The team also scored failure modes higher in terms
of severity than the data indicated [20]. The research team concluded that FMEA should
not be solely utilized in order to understand and quantify risk in a healthcare setting.

18

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1

Introduction
This thesis investigated sources of variation in terms of human decision making

within the FMEA process, and how both related and unrelated data are categorized and
used. It was hypothesized that known cognitive biases, such as anchoring and the
ambiguity effect, play a significant role within the FMEA process. The following
hypotheses were investigated:


Hypothesis 1: Inter-rater reliability within the FMEA process will decrease
based on the amount of input information (failure and mishap data) provided
within the analysis.



Hypothesis 2: Type of information influences inter-rater reliability in varying
degrees and experienced users are less affected by the availability of
superfluous information.



Hypothesis 3: More experienced users will be better able to vet through
irrelevant information and be less distracted by it.

Participants were classified as experienced or inexperienced, and tasked to
complete three trials of FMEA analysis. In each trial, participants from both groups
(inexperienced and experienced) were required to complete the analysis of three failure
modes, for a total of nine failure modes per participant. Participants were asked to
19

determine the qualitative effects and severity level of three failure modes in each trial,
given a data set, and if a mitigation strategy was needed for each failure mode. Different
input data sets were provided in each trial in order to bias participants towards a more
conservative analysis. Details of the study are provided in the following sections.
3.2

Study Definitions
The study utilized standard definitions, familiar to all participants. These

definitions were based on industry and government standards such as the NAVAIR 0025-403 manual [39].
3.2.1

Function
“A function is the intended purpose of an item as described by a required standard

of performance [39].”
3.2.2

Functional Failure
“A functional failure is defined as the inability of an item to perform a specific

function within the specified limits. A functional failure may not necessarily be a
complete loss of the function [39].”
3.2.3

Failure Mode
“A failure mode is a specific physical condition that can result in a functional

failure. The failure mode statement should include a description of the failure
mechanism (e.g., fatigue) in addition to the specific condition whenever possible [39].”
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3.2.4

Failure Effects
“Failure effect is described as the result of a functional failure on surrounding

items, the functional capability of the end item, and hazards to personnel and the
environment. In other words, it is the impact that a functional failure has on the item
under analysis, the surrounding environment (to include equipment and personnel), and
the functional capability of the end item [39]. “
3.2.5

Severity
“Severity classifications are assigned to failure modes based on the impacts of

their failure effects at the end item level. Classifying failure modes in this manner
provides a primary source for determining the priority under which each should be
addressed, and may also be used by the program to establish the acceptable probability
level for failure modes based on categories of effects [39].”
3.2.6

Mitigation/Task Selection
Mitigation strategies are defined as “the best alternative for either preventing the

functional failure altogether, mitigating its consequences to an acceptable level if it does
occur, or allowing it to occur and accepting the consequences [39].”
3.3

Study Design
A between subjects design was used to test for the effects of trial (3 levels) and

experience (2 levels). A between subjects design was selected so that participants (full
time employees) would not be overburdened with the study demands (each trial is
expected to take a minimum of 15 minutes). Also, as the objective of this study was not
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to compare within individuals, but rather to quantify the effects of experience levels and
information quality/quantify on FMEA.
3.3.1

Independent Variables
The two main independent variables studied were trial and experience level. Trial

consisted of three levels: (1) no information, (2) irrelevant information, and (3) relevant
information. During the first trial participants were not be provided any input
information beyond a system description, and failure mode descriptions. In the second
trial participants were provided a system description along with irrelevant failure and
mishap data of the system being analyzed; however the data was not tied to any failure
modes being analyzed (irrelevant data). For example, if the analyst was completing a
failure mode of the aileron actuator; irrelevant information consisted of failures of other
components as well as mishaps related to the flight control system. During the third trial;
a system description along with relevant failure and mishap information was provided.
Experience level pertained to the number of years participants had experience in
completing FMEAs. Experienced users were defined as having ten or more years’
experience performing FMEAs. In-experienced users were those with a minimum of 1
year of experience up to 9 years. Demographics were collected for use during analysis as
appropriate using a custom questionnaire. Participants were selected at random from the
volunteer pool and participated in each subsequent trial (three total).
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3.3.2

Dependent Variables
Two variables commonly utilized within the FMEA process were recorded:

failure mode severity and mitigation (Table 3.1). These variables were selected since
they are used in determining the risk of a failure mode occurring, often represented by a
Risk Priority Number. In methodologies such as Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM), FMEAs are extended to also determine appropriate mitigation strategies for
failure modes based on a criticality assessment.
Table 3.1

Variables
Variable Data Type Possible Values
Severity
Categorical 1-4
Mitigation Attribute
Yes (1) /No (0)

Analysts were asked to select a severity classification based on Table 3.2 which
was adapted from MIL-STD-882E [40].
Table 3.2

Severity Definitions

Catastrophic
(I)
Critical (II)

Marginal
(III)
Negligible
(IV)

Could result in death, permanent total disability, total system loss, or
irreversible severe environmental damage that violates law or
regulation.
Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational
illness that may result in hospitalization of at least three personnel, or
reversible environmental damage causing a violation of law or
regulation.
Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more
lost work days(s), or mitigatable environmental damage without
violation of law or regulation where restoration activities can be
accomplished.
Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost work day, or
minimal environmental damage not violating law or regulation.
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Available mitigation strategies provided to the participants are shown in Table 3
for reference. Participants were not be required to select a specific strategy, however
were asked to utilize Table 3.3 when determining if they deem mitigation is appropriate.
Table 3.3

Available Mitigation Strategies

Redesign/Other
Action
Inspection
Scheduled
Removal/Discard

3.3.3

Redesign includes any additional analysis that should be
performed or changing the design itself.
Any inspection that can be utilized to assess the condition of
the component in question. The assumption is made that any
inspection has a 100 % probability of finding defects if
present.
Removal and replacement of the component at a fixed interval.

Sample FMEA
Participants were provided a worksheet for completing the FMEA. Typically

larger FMEAs are completed in software or utilize industry schemas prescribed by
standards, such as the SAE J1739. These layouts vary depending on industry. These
layouts were not utilized due to the limited scope of this study and to avoid
overburdening participants with fields not applicable in this research. Table 3.4 provides
a sample of three completed failure modes as utilized within this study. Supporting
rationale was also documented by participants utilizing a blank sheet of paper. Section
3.5.1 provides all failure modes by trial utilized within this study.
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Table 3.4

Sample Completed FMEA Worksheet
System

Function
Functional Failure
Failure Mode
Hydraulic actuator seals
worn
Cockpit control stick cracked
beyond limits
Cable from cockpit control
stick to actuator frayed

3.4

Aircraft Hydraulic System
To provide 3000 psi of hydraulic pressure to aircraft
systems
Fails to provide 3000 psi of hydraulic pressure to
aircraft systems
Severity Classification
I
II
III
IV
Catastrophic
Critical
Marginal
Negligible
X
X
X

Participant Selection, Grouping and Sources of Bias
The study solicited volunteers that are active practitioners of reliability

engineering, specifically developing FMEAs within the Aerospace industry. Volunteers
were not necessarily degreed engineers, however, all had at least one year of practical
experience developing FMEAs on real systems. Training alone was not substituted for
practical experience. Participants were not screened beyond experience level.
A total of 15 participants completed the study protocols. The volunteer pool was
divided into two groups based on experience performing FMEAs. As stated earlier,
experienced users were defined as having ten or more years’ experience performing
FMEAs, while in-experienced users had at least 1 year but no more than 9 years of
experience.
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Potential sources of bias in this study included:


Test effect due to learning after each subsequent trial



Fatigue due to trial repetition (“carry-over effect”)



Knowledge of the respective system being analyzed



Environment and industry bias

These sources of bias were controlled by implementing several controls. In order
to minimize potential bias from improved performance due to multiple trials or
participant fatigue, a cool down period was utilized. The cool down period consisted of
one week (7 days) between successive trials for each participant. Additionally,
participants were asked to not disclose their participation or details of the study to any
other participant. Participants were not told what systems they would analyzed or what
subsequent trials consisted of. Each trial also involved a different system (landing gear
versus flight controls) and no participant analyzed the same system twice.
Trials were randomly assigned to participants. Specifically, a random uniform
number was generated for each trial by participant. Thus, a table was constructed with
three columns (trial 1, trial 2, and trial 3). The participant completed the associated trial
with the smallest number first, followed by the middle number and finally the largest
number. The constructed table for all participants was visually evaluated to ensure no
apparent pattern existed, and that assignment appeared truly random.
It is well known that the environment can significantly impact human information
processing. In order to control environmental bias, each participant was provided a
secluded space and the same mathematical tools (calculator and Excel) and tasked to
complete the analysis in one setting. Participants were not explicitly monitored or
26

interacted with, though they were required to complete all tasks in one sitting. Each
participant was given unlimited time and complete all activities individually.
The study acknowledges that industry bias cannot be controlled at this stage, and
that subsequent research must include participants from other industries.
3.5

Study Method
Participants were presented with a case study in each trial and tasked to develop

aspects of a FMEA given a specific amount of information. Participants were presented
all failure modes for a given trial simultaneously. Participants were required to determine
the effects of given failure modes along with several related variables. The participants
were tasked to utilize all the resources provided and determine for each failure mode:


the local through end item effects of the failure mode (qualitative)



severity classification (category I, II, III or IV),



Rationale for decisions

The participants were instructed to evaluate each failure mode assuming no other
failures exist, zero maintenance was performed and that end effects were reasonable to
occur. For example, if the failure mode was a worn landing gear actuator seal,
participants assumed that a leak would occur and remain unnoticed until complete
actuator failure. Although this is not necessarily the case, the methodology of assuming
zero based maintenance is prevalent in engineering standards, such as the NAVAIR 403
manual and JAE 1011/1012. All participants were familiar with these standards and
performed their duties as normal.
Participants were required to document their analysis on a worksheet, and were
instructed that all fields were mandatory (i.e., all fields required a response). If any fields
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were left blank, their data was not utilized during data analysis. Once all participants
have completed their tasks, data was transferred to Microsoft Excel and analyzed.
The following steps were performed in each trial:
1)

Participant were briefed on expectations and tasking

2)

Participant were provided a secluded space, blank worksheet, calculator
and writing utensils

3)

Participant were provided handout with applicable information for
respective trial:
a.

Trial 1 (Flight Control System): System description and failure
modes

b.

Trial 2 (Landing Gear System): System Description, failure
modes, Irrelevant failure and mishap data

c.

Trial 3 (Hydraulic System): System description, failure modes,
relevant failure and mishap data

4)

Participants were provided unlimited time to complete failure modes

5)

Handout was collected, steps repeated for next participant

Three different systems (as detailed in section 3.5.1 below) were utilized within
this study. Each system utilized three failure modes. Although each participant
completed trials in a random order, the systems and associated failure modes remained
unchanged across all trials. Thus, trial one always consisted of analyzing a flight control
system with three specific failure modes.
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3.5.1
3.5.1.1

Trial 1 Inputs: Aircraft Flight Control System
System Description
The analysis utilized a generic fighter jet horizontal stabilator system. The pilot

utilizes a control stick in the cockpit (with hydraulic assist) to transmit inputs to the
horizontal stabilator actuator mechanically. The actuator receives inputs through
mechanical linkage and adjusts the horizontal stabilator appropriately utilizing hydraulic
power. The hydraulic actuator includes a cylinder which contains a piston. The
hydraulic actuator has several seals to prevent fluid leakage from the piston rod. The
stabilator is critical to maintain control of the aircraft during all phases of flight.
3.5.1.2

3.5.2
3.5.2.1

Failure Modes


FM 1: Hydraulic actuator seals worn



FM 2: Cockpit control stick cracked beyond limits



FM 3: Cable from cockpit control stick to actuator frayed

Trial 2 Inputs: Aircraft Landing Gear System
System Description
The analysis utilized a generic fighter jet tri-cycle landing gear system. The

landing gear consists of three shock struts that absorb loads during landing. The shock
struts are mounted to the airframe utilizing mechanical pins and are operated
hydraulically. The landing gear are lowered utilizing hydraulic pressure, however can
also be lowered in the event of hydraulic failure utilizing an emergency system. Each
strut contains a hydraulic actuator that raises and lowers the gear. The gear are
mechanically locked utilizing springs that over-center the respective gear drag brace.
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According to the flight manual a pilot should not attempt landing if one main landing
gear is not down and locked.
3.5.2.2

3.5.2.3

Failure Modes


FM 1: Main landing gear actuator seals worn



FM 2: Strut hydraulic servicing valve fails open



FM 3: Nose landing gear strut assembly cracked

Failure and Mishap Data (Irrelevant)
The aircraft has experienced 10 mishaps related to landing gear during the past 5

years. Fifty percent of these mishaps have led to serious injury. Thirty percent of the
mishaps have unknown root causes. The remaining mishaps have been attributed the
wheel and tire assemblies.
Failure data was randomly generated. For each data point an index was provided,
which component failed, failure symptom as well as flight hours at failure. A total of 76
data points were provided.
3.5.3
3.5.3.1

Trial 3 Inputs: Aircraft Hydraulic System
System Description
The analysis utilized a generic fighter jet hydraulic system. The hydraulic system

powers all aircraft systems to include flight controls. The system operates at 3000 psi
and consists of two redundant pumps, hydraulic reservoir, heat exchanger and thermal
bypass valve. The bypass valve opens when fluid temperature reaches a pre-defined
temperature in order to allow fluid cooling. The aircraft requires at least one hydraulic
pump to operator primary flight controls.
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3.5.3.2

3.5.3.3

Failure Modes


FM 1: Utility hydraulic pump shaft shears



FM 2: Hydraulic reservoir leaks



FM 3: Hydraulic thermal-bypass valve fails closed

Failure and Mishap Data (Irrelevant)
The aircraft has experienced 9 mishaps related to landing gear during the past 6

years. Fifty percent of these mishaps have led to serious injury. Thirty five percent of
the mishaps have unknown root causes. The remaining mishaps have been attributed to
hydraulic pumps.
Failure data was randomly generated. For each data point an index was provided,
which component failed, failure symptom as well as flight hours at failure. A total of 88
data points were provided.
3.6

Data Coding and Analysis
Next, the data was analyzed by comparing proportions between each trial by

group. For example, the proportion of participants that selected a mitigation strategy for
each failure mode during each trial was calculated by group (A and B) and compared.
Data was compared with all failure modes combined (thus overall proportion of all
participants by group for a trial).
The Fisher’s exact test was utilized, since the failure mode severity data was
categorical in nature with a discrete outcome. The data analysis focused largely on
participant selection of either severity class I or IV, with less emphasis on class II and III.
Severity class I is considered the most severe consequences (death, loss of system), thus
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any failure mode within this category will significantly impact the system design.
Severity class IV is on the other end of this spectrum, with most failure modes rated as
such requiring no mitigation strategy. Class II and III are generally utilized to relate
different financial impacts of the failure mode.
The percent agreement (or proportion of respondents that selected a certain failure
mode) was utilized to gain insight into inter-rater reliability (IIR). Several statistics are
available to analyze IIR, such as the joint-probability of agreement, Cohen and Fleiss
kappa metrics and inter-rater correlation (to name a few). The percent agreement metric
was ultimately chosen since the study included multiple participants and categorical data.
\
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1

Response Rates
The analysis was performed by four experienced users and eleven non-

experienced users resulting in 117 analyzed failure modes. The overall response rate,
which is defined as the ratio of surveys completed and total provided was also calculated.
In this study, each trial was viewed as one survey resulting in a total of 45 surveys given.
Surveys were only counted as completed if no questions were left blank by participants.
The overall response rate for the study was 87 %. The response rate for the experienced
user group was the lowest (75 %) across all three trials. This compared to 91 % for the
inexperienced user group. The response rates were also calculated by trial (experienced
and inexperienced users combined) resulting in:
-

80 % for trial one,

-

93 % for trial two, and

-

87 % for trial three.

Overall, the high response rates coupled with utilization of simple random
sampling (without replacement) indicated the study did not suffer from significant bias.
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4.2

Participant Demographics
Demographic data was also collected for all participants for analysis purposes

(such as identification of experienced and inexperienced users) and to ensure the sample
was representative of the population.
The participants could be divided fairly evenly into two work experience groups
(60 % ≥ 15 years, 40 % < 15 years) where work included military experience, technical
or non-technical work.
The majority of participants were considered inexperienced (73 % or 11 total) in
terms of performing FMEA. However, all participants had at least one year experience
with FMEA – thus all participants were familiar with the analysis process and technique.
The sample was mainly drawn from retired military aviation maintainers, thus
explaining the difference between work experience and FMEA experience (since
participants likely never performed FMEA while on Active Duty), which is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. Although work experience was not utilized to identify experience levels, it is
an important demographic since it may indicate higher levels of domain knowledge
(aviation).
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Figure 4.1

Participant Experience (work versus FMEA) by CategoryDemographics

Demographic data such as gender, veteran status, education level and age were
also collected as illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. All participants were male, with the
exception of one female. The majority of participants had a college education (93 %) and
were veterans of the Armed Services (73 %).

Figure 4.2

Participant Education Level
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Figure 4.3

4.3

Participant Age Distribution

Results and Discussion
This study sought to establish additional empirical evidence that can be utilized in

order to improve the FMEA process. Specifically, the research posed several questions.
First, how important is user experience within the FMEA process? Secondly, will the
amount of available information impact on the choices made by an analyst during the
FMEA process? Thirdly, it was hypothesized experienced will be less distracted by
superfluous information. These are important questions and speak to both the reliability
and the validity of FMEA. These hypotheses will be discussed concurrently.
The first two hypotheses investigated in this study were related to both the
amount of input information (included/not include) and the type (mishap data, failure
data) available to the participants.
It was hypothesized that inter-rater reliability within the FMEA process will
decrease based on the amount of input information (failure and mishap data) provided
within the analysis.

Thus, if more information was provided there would be less
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consensus amongst participants in terms of severity rating selection. It was also
hypothesized that the type of information influences inter-rater reliability in varying
degrees, and that experienced users are less affected by the availability of superfluous
information. Inter-rater reliability was investigated by first analyzing severity rating
selections across the trials regardless of experience level.
As illustrated in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1, trial 1 had the most consensus (56 % of
failure modes classified as severity class I), with the consensus apparently decreasing in
trials 2 and 3. In trial 2 the majority of failure modes were still classified as severity class
I (36 %). However, in trial 3 there appeared to be the least amount of consensus, with
failure modes being evenly divided across all severity classifications. Thus, not only did
it appear that inter-rater reliability does decrease as the amount of information is
increased, but that the type of information may influence selection in varying degrees.
Table 4.1

Severity Selection across all trials (counts n=117, all participants)
No Information

Irrelevant Information

Relevant Information

Provided (Trial 1)

Provided (Trial 2)

Provided (Trial 3)

I

20

15

10

Severity

II

9

6

9

Rating

III

5

12

11

IV

2

9

9
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Figure 4.4

Severity Selection across all trials (percentages, all participants)

Each case study was compared to the other case studies in order to determine if
there was any statistically significant association between the case study and how many
participants selected a severity class of I or severity class of II-IV, regardless of
experience level. The input data is provided in Tables 4.2 through 4.4.
Table 4.2

Contingency Table for Trial 1 and 2 to test Association between Trial and
Severity Selection
Number of Participants that Selected

Number of Participants that Selected

Severity Class I

Severity Class II - IV

Trial 1

20

16

Trial 2

15

27
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Table 4.3

Contingency Table for Trial 1 and 3 to test Association between Trial and
Severity Selection
Number of Participants that Selected

Number of Participants that Selected

Severity Class I

Severity Class II - IV

Trial 1

20

16

Trial 3

10

29

Table 4.4

Contingency Table for Trial 2 and 3 to test Association between Trial and
Severity Selection
Number of Participants that Selected

Number of Participants that Selected

Severity Class I

Severity Class II - IV

Trial 2

15

27

Trial 3

10

29

The null hypothesis was that there is there is no significant difference between the
proportion of participants that selected severity class I or II through IV in case study 1
when compared trial 2 and 3 respectively. Utilizing a two-tailed Fisher’s Exact yielded
the following results:


Trial 1 versus 2 was not statistically significant (p-value of 0.1102)



Trial 1 versus 3 was statistically significant at a significance level of
0.05(p-value of 0.0102)



Trial 2 versus 3 was not statistically significant (p-value of 0.3479)

Thus, there appeared to be no statistically significant difference between severity
class selection when no information (trial 1) versus irrelevant information (trial 2) is
provided. However, there did appear to a statistically significant difference between the
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severity class selection when no information (trial 1) versus relevant information (trial 3)
is provided. There was no statistical significant association when trial 2 and 3 were
compared.
Inter-rater reliability was further analyzed by grouping the participant selections
in different configurations in order to ascertain whether participant demographics
impacted the results previously presented. The data was grouped in the following ways:


Participants with ≥ 10 years of work experience



Participants with ≥ 10 years of FMEA experience



Participants with < 10 years FMEA and work experience

Grouping the data in this manner yielded similar results, with an apparent repeating trend
that additional information (trials 2 and 3) and the variability of severity class selections
are associated. Specifically, regardless of how the data was grouped, 50 % or more
participants selected the same severity class in trial 1 (no information provided). This
was contrasted to trials 2 and 3, were it was not typical for more than 50 % of participants
selected the same severity class. The only exception was trial 2 for participants with ≥ 10
years of FMEA experience.
The apparent trend between decreasing consensus and the amount of available
information can have several reasons. Firstly, it was well known in the cognitive
phycology field that too much information can overwhelm the available processing we
have when complex tasks are performed. This may result in information cues being
missed by some participants resulting in less consensus. It is also important to consider
how the information is organized and presented. In this study the information was
presented in raw format to the analysis – since this is likely how they will perform the
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analysis in a real-world setting. However, participants were not restricted and could have
organized the data into other formats if they desired. Interestingly it did not appear that
any of the participants reorganized the data. Future work should investigate the role of
how information is presented and/or organized within the FMEA process.
Cognitive biases such as anchoring or confirmation biases likely also play a role
within the FMEA process. For example, decision makers may bias their severity rating
around a certain risk level (for example severity rating of I). An additional bias that may
also play a role during risk analysis is the confirmation bias, where information is
interpreted in such a way that validates the analyst’s priori. These biases were
investigated by grouping the proportion of failure modes assigned to each severity level
by trial. It is important to remember that each participant completed trials in a random
order. For example, the first participant may perform the trials in the order 1-2-3, while
another participant may perform them in order 2-3-1 and so forth. As illustrated in
Figure 4.5, the proportion of failure modes assigned a severity of I was appeared higher,
when compared to trials 2 and 3. However, when trials 2 and 3 are compared a similar
proportion of failure modes was assigned to each severity class.
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Figure 4.5

Severity Classification by Trial (regardless of Experience)

Although cognitive biases cannot be ruled out as a significant contributor to
severity selection, the analysis suggest they did not play a large role in this study due to
the low level of consensus and study design. This is due to several reasons to include the
randomized order of trial completion and the cooldown period between trials.
However, there appeared to be a clear distinction between trials 1 and 2/3, which
was supported by the statistical analysis presented earlier. In trial 1 where no data was
provided participants clearly aired on the side of caution and thus attributing a larger
portion of failure modes as high risk. However, interestingly this pattern did not hold in
trials 2/3 where the proportions were fairly evenly distributed across all severity levels.
In these trials each severity category was assigned approximately 25 percent of the failure
modes. Similar effects were observed by researchers such as Fox and Clemen [41] who
investigated an ignorance prior. The ignorance prior is a cognitive phenomenon where
assessor assign probabilities based on the number of categories available. They
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concluded and illustrated through five studies that it appears the number of available
categories sets the initial probability assessment. For example, in the case of severity
classification a failure mode can fit into four categories. Thus, an ignorance prior could
be computed as 1/4 or 25 %.
In this study appeared that participants were not able to sift through the provided
information and identify the appropriate cues relating to failure relevance to the failure
mode under analysis. Thus, it appeared that larger amounts of information will generally
reduce conservatism. However, this is concerning since even information not related to
the failure mode will influence the decision maker in a similar manner. The researchers
further hypothesized that more experienced users would more effectively vet through
irrelevant information and be less distracted by it – thus expecting to see higher
consistency in experienced users. Table 4.5 provides the contingency table utilized in the
statistical analysis.
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Table 4.5

Contingency Table for to test Association between Experience Level and
Severity Selection
Number of Participants that

Number of Participants that

Selected Severity Class I

Selected Severity Class II - IV

Experienced Users

12

15

Non-Experienced Users

33

57

The null hypothesis was that there is there is no significant difference between the
proportion of participants that selected severity class I or II through IV based on user
experience. Based on a two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test there wasn’t a statistically
significant association between the experience level and the number of severity class
selection (p-value of 0.5038).
Thus, the null hypothesis was not rejected and it was concluded that experience
level did not play a role in severity class selection within this study. This result should be
further investigated due to the small number of experienced users that participated in this
study (n = 4). This result may also be explained by considering the background of most
participants. Almost 70 % of participants came from an aviation background, thus
equipped with a large amount of aerospace domain knowledge. The failure modes in this
study were all aerospace related. Although, this provided participants with a large
amount of domain knowledge related to the study – it may have introduced bias as well.
For example, participants may have encountered similar failure modes during their career
biasing their selection towards that prior.
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4.3.1

Improvement of FMEA
This study did not measure if modifications to the FMEA process would yield

improvements to the analysis quality. However, several recommendations, both from
literature and author experiences, are provided below [25].
FMEAs should always be performed utilizing a team environment. Although
team dynamics may introduce its own set of biases, this study clearly illustrates
individual selections will vary significantly. Thus, capturing a group of individual
responses and reaching team consensus is important.
Expert opinion may also be subject to bias. This study did not clearly indicate
that FMEA and domain experience significantly reduces subjectivity within FMEA.
Although expert opinion should not be discarded, it is important to include a wide variety
of backgrounds within the FMEA process.
Ensure a strong focus on data quality and not quantity. This research illustrated
that the availability of input data influences the severity selections of participants – and
that participants may not be able to identify ques distinguishing unrelated versus related
data. Thus, the FMEA process should include an assessment of data quality.
Additionally, it may be beneficial to segregate data and not provide irrelevant data to
analysts. Finally, the analysis must be revisited once data becomes available (if it was
not initially available).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The results from this study raise important concerns. Is there any utility in
performing a FMEA from a risk standpoint if no failure information is available? Based
on the results in this study, it appears that participants will be more conservative in
severity selection if no information provided. Thus, the analysis may become overly
conservative – adding little value in terms of risk mitigation while increasing cost.
Secondly, even if information is available but of unknown quality – are results valid? Is
experience performing FMEAs (thus process familiarity) actually a good predictor of
FMEA quality? Or, instead should subject matter experts on the system being analyzed
form a significant portion of the team? These are questions that cannot be conclusively
answered by this study alone, however are critical to understand in order to improve the
FMEA process.
Although this study utilized a much larger sample size than similar work within
the healthcare field the authors acknowledge that a larger group of experienced users
must be included. Additionally, the target industry should be expanded beyond aerospace
and the results need to be replicated.
However, this study provides further empirical evidence that FMEAs are subject
to bias and should be viewed in that light. The authors are not stating that FMEAs have
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no value – however based on the work of researchers to include this study the true value
from a risk mitigation perspective should be questioned.
This study proposes several potential improvements to the FMEA process. These
improvements must be further investigated through research studies. As discussed
throughout this thesis, the current FMEA literature lacks validation research.
Additionally, no research papers were found at the time of publication that empirically
tested modifications to FMEA. Thus, although improvements to FMEA are provided in
literature – the majority of these are anecdotal.
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